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EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES-CREATION,
PROCEDURES, AND AUTHORITY
Executive committees, relatively new board of director aids, are com-
mittees composed of directors which can act for the corporation in place
of the full board of directors.' They have been increasingly used by large,
publicly held corporations in the last few decades,2 and have prompted con-
siderable comment during that period of time.' There is, however, a need
to correlate, along functional lines, the older case law and the more recent,
but nearly universal, statutory regulation of executive committees4 both
with each other and with the actual practice of corporations which use
such committees.
Information concerning executive committee use in publicly held cor-
porations was obtained by means of three recent surveys. One survey, en-
titled The Executive Committee of the Board of Directors: Duties, Mem-
1. Comment, Corporations-The Executive Committee in Corporate Organization-
Scope of Powers, 42 MICH. L. Rav. 133, 135-36 (1943). This Comment contains the
most comprehensive review and analysis of the older case law in the executive committee
field.
2. See Mylander, Management by Executive Committee, 33 HARv. Bus. REv. 51
(May-June 1955).
3. See generally Aurell, The Corporate Executive Committee: A Dilemma for the
Nonmember Director, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 525 (1965); Mehler, Directoral Group Action
and Legal Reponsibility, 33 N.D.L. REv. 190 (1957); Note, Corporate Executive Com-
mittees, 16 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 167 (1967); Comment, Corporations-The Executive
Committee in Corporate Organization-Scope of Powers, 42 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1943);
Comment, Delegating the Managerial Functions of Corporate Directors, 5 So. Tx. L.J.
293 (1960); Note, Delegation of Duties by Corporate Directors, 25 AL33ANY L. REv. 93
(1961); 6 ARK. L. REv. 486 (1951); 34 CH.-KENT L. REV. 339 (1956); 20 HAnv. L.
REv. 225 (1906); 35 Ky. L.J. 156 (1947); 34 MARQ. L. REv. 48 (1950); 47 VA. L.
Rv. 278 (1961).
4. All states and the District of Columbia, with the exception of Arizona and Mon.
tana, currently have such statutes. ALA, CODE tit. 10, § 21(29) (Supp. 1965); ALASKA
STAT. § 10.05.195 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306 (1966); CAL. CORP. CODE §§
501(e), 822 (Deering 1962); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-7 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 33-318 (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §9 141(c), (g) (Supp. 1966);
D.C. CODE § 29-916(e) (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.09(2) (Supp. 1966); GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-1867 (1966); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 172-97 (1955); IDAHo CODE ANN.
§ 30-139 (Supp. 1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-206 (1960), § 25-208 (Supp. 1966); IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.39
(Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-3101 (1964); Ky. rv. STAT. ANN.
§ 271.345 (1963); LA. RaV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:29(B) (7), 12:34(C)(7) (1950); ME.
Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 371 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 59 (1966); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 55 (Supp. 1966); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.13(4)(d)
(1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 301.28(4)(7), (8) (Supp. 1966); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 5309-77 (Supp. 1966); Mo. RV. STAT. § 351.330 (1959); NEn. Rv. STAT. § 21-114
(1962); NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.125 (1963); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294:89 (1966);
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bership, Compensation,' was conducted by McCulloch and Thompson
for the Conference Board Record in 1966, and will be referred to as
the Conference Board Record survey. Another survey was made in
1962 by the National Industrial Conference Board in cooperation with
the American Society of Corporate Secretaries for inclusion in Corporate
Directorship Practices,' and will be referred to as the National Indus-
trial Conference survey. The third survey was conducted by the author
of this note by sending a questionnaire (reproduced in Appendix A) to
the secretaries of 470 corporations.7 Two hundred replies were received,
of which 161 were of sufficient detail to provide information for this note.
Because of a pledge of confidentiality, the names of the respondents will
not be used. When reference is made to a survey without naming it, the
reference will be to the author's survey.
CREATION, PROCEDURES, AND AUTHORITY OF EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES.
The three basic areas which have concerned the courts and the legisla-
tures are: (1) creation and control, (2) procedures and mechanics, and
(3) authority and power of the committee. In each of these areas the
discussion will concentrate on the statutes, case law, and actual practices
as revealed by the surveys.
A. Creation and Control of the Executive Committee
1. Creation
Since the board of directors is the body which is entrusted by statute
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:7-4 (1937); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-2-14 (1962); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 712 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-31 (1965); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 10-19-42 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.11(B)(5), 1701.63
(Page 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1.36, 1.38(7) (1953); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 57.206 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2852-402(6), (7) (Supp. 1966); R.I. GEN.
Lws § 7-4-6 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.11 (Supp. 1966); S.D. CODE § 11.0707
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-406 (1964); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 2.36 (1956);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-39 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 223 (1959); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-40 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.400 (Supp. 1966) (effective
July 1, 1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-1-16, -20 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.36
(Supp. 1967); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.37 (1965); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP.
Act § 38 (1966).
5. McCulloch & Thompson, The Executive Committee of the Board of Directors:
Duties, Membership, Compensation, 3 CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD 16 (July 1966).
6. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BD. & AMERICAN SoC' OF CORPORATE SEC-
RETARIES, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES 112 (1962).
7. The survey was conducted on those corporations which are required to file annual
reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission, as listed in SECURITIES & Ex-
CHANGE COMM'N, DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES FILING ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (1965). Questionnaires were sent to every
tenth company so listed which was also listed in STANDARD & POOR, POOR'S REGISTER
(1966).
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with the managerial authority over corporate affairs,' most executive com-
mittee statutes grant the power to create the committee directly to the
board.' Some statutes absolutely vest the power of creation in the board of
directors-"the board of directors may... designate one or more commit-
tees . . . . ,-as it sees fit. Others vest the power to create an executive
committee in the board except as otherwise provided in the by-laws,"' the
certificate of incorporation,"2 or both."3 Under the latter type of statute,
the existence of the board's power is not contingent upon charter or by-law
authorization, but its continuance is dependent on the absence of a negat-
ing charter or by-law provision.' 4 It is in essence a defeasible power.
In contrast, the Model Business Corporation Act " and several state
statutes" make the existence of the board's power to create an executive
committee contingent upon charter or by-law authorization-"If the ar-
ticles of incorporation or by-laws so provide, .... "' Unless there is an
enabling authorization, the directors do not have the power to create a
committee.'" Because such statutes require a charter or by-law provision
allowing the board to create a committee before a director resolution mak-
ing the appointment is valid, the power over creation is, in effect, held
indirectly by those who control amendments to the corporate charter or
8. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1953); ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 33 (1966) ("The business and affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board
of directors.").
9. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(29) (Supp. 1965). But see HAwAU I.Ev. LAws §
172-97 (1955); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 371 (1964). See generally ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 38 (1966). The Hawaii and Maine statutes au-
thorize appointment of committees of the board of directors, but do not state expressly
who has the power of appointment.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (Supp. 1966); accord, ALA. CODE tit. 10, §
21(29) (Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-208 (Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-3101 (1964); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:29(B)(7) (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
21.13(4)(d) (1963); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-114 (1962); N.H. Rsv. STAT. ANN. §
294:89 (1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-16 (1966).
11. Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.345(4) (1963) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28 (4) (8) (Supp.
1966).
12. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.09(2) (1956).
13. IDAHo CODE ANN. § 30-139(2)(e) (Supp. 1965).
14. Note that some statutes use the term "unless" rather than "except." E.g., Nv.
Rnv. STAT. § 78.125 (1963).
15. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 38 (1966) (hereinafter referred to in the
text as the Model Act).
16. E.g., Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 351.330 (1966) (by-laws); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712
(McKinney 1963).
17. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.39 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
18. Compare OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.36 (1953), with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 1.38(7) (1953).
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by-laws-usually the shareholders.'" So that, if the board's power to create
an executive committee is contingent upon by-law authorization, but by-law
authorization is dependent upon shareholder approval, either directly or
through charter amendment control, it is the shareholders as a group who in
reality have the power to decide whether to create an executive committee.
In summary, although executive committees are always created by a
board of directors' resolution, whether or not the board in fact possesses
the power to decide whether to create a committee is dependent upon
whether the board's power of creation is contingent or vested. If it is vested,
the board has the power to decide to use a committee if it wants, or has
that power at least until the by-laws are amended to take away that power.
If it is contingent upon corporate charter or by-law authority, the power
of committee creation rests with the group, directors or shareholders, having
charter or by-law adoption and amendment powers.2"
The survey indicates that the by-laws of 85 of the 101 corporations
with executive committees give the directors the power to create those com-
mittees; 12 of these 85 reported that the power was granted by the charter
as well as the by-laws.2 The Conference Board Record survey found that
most reporting companies have specific by-law provisions establishing the
committee or allowing the board of directors to do so, but that some
boards of directors had done so without by-law authorization. The National
Industrial Conference survey indicated that 90% of the manufacturing
companies reporting had by-laws which permitted or required the creation
of an executive committee; 87% had comparable charter provisions and
19. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(d) (Supp. 1966); ABA-ALI MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 54 (1966).
20. Furthermore, some statutes also treat the problem of committee creation in the
section describing what provisions a corporation's by-laws may contain; the by-laws may
contain a director enabling provision regarding executive committees. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 501 (Deering 1962); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-206 (1960); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
12:29(B)(7) (1950); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.11(B)(5) (Page 1964); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-20 (1966).
21. A typical charter reads: "[T]he Board of Directors are [sic] expressly authorized:
.... To appoint standing committees by affirmative vote of a majority of the whole
Board, and such standing committees shall have and may exercise such powers as shall be
confirmed or authorized by the By-Laws." The by-laws of the same company provide:
"The Board of Directors shall elect from the Directors an Executive Committee. .. "
Another company's by-laws are more permissive: "The Board, by resolution adopted by
a majority of the whole Board, may designate.., an Executive Committee .... " How-
ever, one respondent said that its directors did not create its committee but did not say
who had. Another reported that the president had created the committee but that the
directors had approved the action. It should be noted that a by-law giving the power
of creation to someone other than the directors may be invalid. Stiegerwald v. A. M.
Stiegerwald Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 31, 132 N.E.2d 373 (1955).
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11% had no specific by-law or charter authorization for executive com-
mittee creation.
The survey further indicated that the power to appoint original members
and to fill vacancies on the executive committee is also vested in the board
of directors.2 However, in a small number of instances, the executive com-
mittee is given the power to fill vacancies. The Conference Board Record
and the National Industrial Conference surveys reported that the by-laws
of their respondent companies contained provisions for alternates to be
appointed by the board of directors, either as they are needed or at the
same time the regular committee members are appointed.
The statutes usually prescribe how the directors are to exercise their
power to create executive committees. Most expressly require a majority
of the board to act in the creation,2 and several enumerate the way in
which that majority is to be determined. Some statutes, on the other
hand, do not specifically indicate the portion of the board which must act
to establish a committee,25 but presumably rely on the general statute
specifying requirements for board action.2" In addition, Minnesota re-
quires unanimous board action to create an executive committee, 2 as
does Oklahoma when the charter or by-laws fail to specifically authorize
the use of such committees. 2 Two further restrictions on the board of
directors' power to create an executive committee relate to the proper
number and the type of members being appointed. Although a majority
of statutes require that executive committees consist of two or more mem-
22. While there are no cases on the vacancy problem, some statutes do deal with it.
Three of these allow the committe to fill its own vacancies. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(c) (Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 59 (1966); W. VA. CoDE ANN. §
31-1-16 (Supp. 1966). Three others reserve that power to the board of directors. LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 12:34(0) (7) (1950); N.Y. Bus. Cor. LAW § 712(a) (2) (McKin-
ney 1963) (directors can appoint alternates to fill vacancy); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.63(B) (Page 1964) (directors can appoint alternates).
23. E.g., DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.36
(Supp. 1967). See CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-318 (1962), which allows by-laws to
require more than a majority.
24. E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-7 (1963), ... a majority of the number of
directors fixed by the by-laws, or in the absence of a by-law fixing the number of direc-
tors, then the number stated in the articles of incorporation. .. ."
25. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODY. § 822 (Deering 1962); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-2-14
(1962).
26. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-16(b) (Supp. 1966) (majority unless by-laws
otherwise provide).
27. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28(4) (8) (Supp. 1966).
28. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.38(7) (1953). See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 1.36 (1953).
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bers," some require three members,"° one requires only one member,31 and
several statutes are silent on this point.3 2
Most state statutes provide that only directors are eligible for member-
ship on executive committees."3 This requirement was presented to the
court in Stiegerwald v. A. M. Stiegerwald Co.3 A deadlock occurred in
the board of directors of a closely held corporation, and to circumvent
the deadlock, the board appointed an executive committee of prominent
non-director businessmen to fix officer salaries.3" The plaintiff sued to
enjoin the payment of the salaries the committee fixed and the appellate
court affirmed the injunction granted by the lower court on the ground
that the executive committee, composed of non-directors, could not act
for the corporation. Noting that the Illinois corporation law provided for
executive committees of two or more directors,3" the court held that to
allow non-directors to act as members of such committees would be a
delegation of corporate authority to a group not elected by the share-
holders, a result contrary to the state policy guaranteeing shareholders the
power to elect those who are to act for them.
2. Control
Because the board of directors is entrusted with the management of
the corporation, and because executive committees are created by the
directors to aid in this management function, there should be no question
that the board may control the executive committee. However, some
jurisdictions have codified this implied control in an attempt to eliminate
any doubts as to the relative power of the board of directors and the
29. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.195 (1962); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.330 (1959);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-406 (1964); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-40 (1964).
30. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306 (1966); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712 (McKinney
1963); VT. STAT. ANN. fit. 11, § 223 (1959).
31. NEv. Rav. STAT. § 78.125 (1963).
32. IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.39 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
23A.08.400 (Supp. 1966) (effective July 1, 1967); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 38 (1966).
33. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 33-318 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-39
(1962); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 38 (1966). But see HAwAIn REv. LAws §
172-97 (1955); ME. Raoy. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 371 (1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
294:89 (1966); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-2-14 (1962).
34. 9 Il1. App. 2d 31, 132 N.E.2d 373 (1955).
35. This roundabout method of fixing salaries was attempted because the existing
board members were ineligible to vote on that matter directly as they were interested
therein.
36. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966).
37. See note 8 supra.
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executive committee. s8
Control and supervision take several forms, some or al of which are
used by the reporting companies. The respondents were almost evenly
divided as to the existence of a veto power in the board of directors over
committee action-a small majority reporting that such a power does
exist." There was a similar division as to the existence of informal con-
trol of committee action by requiring consultation between the board and
the committee before the latter acts-a small majority indicating that no
such requirement exists."0 Nearly one-third of the reporting companies
indicated that their boards of directors have the power to specify those areas
in which the committee is to act, and all but four indicated that the board
reviews the work of the executive committee, either by ratifying its actions
or by approving the minutes of the committee meeting at the next board
meeting. Despite these controls on committee action, only eighteen com-
panies reported such extensive director control that director approval was
required to put committee action into effect.
The Conference Board Record survey found that action taken by the
executive committees of one-fifth of its respondents had to be formally
approved by the full board of directors, while for other respondents, the
board had veto power over committee action even though it did not need
to ratify it. Self-imposed restraints were also reported, such as committee
non-action in areas reserved for director action and the necessity of contact-
ing board members for their opinions before the committee took action. The
National Industrial Conference survey indicated the most widespread
practice was the requirement that the committee report its actions to the
board; some of its respondents indicated that committee action was sub-
mitted to the directors for approval even though such submission was not
required. In addition, many indicated that the board of directors had modi-
fication or veto powers over committee action-provided that the rights of
third parties had not intervened.
Board of director delegation of authority to an executive committee
does not relieve the board of its responsibility for the action taken by the
executive committee. De Met's Inc. v. Insull,1 was a suit by the holders
38. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.28(4) (8) (Supp. 1966) (committtee subject to
control and direction of the board); Onio REv. CoDE, ANN. § 1701.63(c) (Page 1964).
39. Many of those reporting such a power indicated it was qualified by the proviso
that no rights of third parties had intervened since the disputed action was taken.
40. Among those which reported such consultation, several stated that it existed only
regarding large committee appropriations or otherwise important resolutions; many ex-
plained its absence as the result of having all director committees so that the committee
knows the board's wishes.
41. 122 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1941).
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of corporate notes against the directors for the improper pledge of assets
and declaration of dividends, both of which had been authorized by the
executive committee. In reversing a judgment for the directors, the court
held that the directors had particpated in the declaration under the state
statute since they gave the committee the power to declare the dividend.
The cases imply that the directors may delegate their work but not their
responsibility to an executive committee, so that if the directors choose
to rely on such a committee they do so at their own risk, regardless of
whether or not they are members of the committee.42 To prevent any
arguments to the contrary, the Model Acte3 and a large group of state
statutes provide that: "The designation of such committee and the delega-
tion thereto of authority shall not operate to relieve the board of directors, or
any member thereof, of any responsibility or liability imposed upon it or
him by law.""
B. Procedures and Mechanics of Executive Committees
1. Frequency of Meetings
The majority of the reporting companies' executive committees meet
"when necessary," that is, a meeting can be called at will. The other com-
mittees meet on a regular schedule-sixteeen companies reported meeting
monthly, twelve weekly, six twice weekly, one tri-weekly, and one reported
meeting daily. Other frequencies reported were quarterly, bi-monthly,
infrequently, and during emergencies. The National Industrial Conference
survey indicated that committees of two-fifths of its manufacturing com-
panies meet irregularly-as needed or as called. The others meet regu-
larly with monthly, weekly, and quarterly meetings respectively being the
most common; the overall frequency of meetings ranged from daily to
annually. As compared to the frequency of director's meetings,4" executive
committee meetings are usually held more often. In addition, the frequency
of executive committee meetings is made more flexible in that often meet-
42. Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 64 Misc. 303, 118 N.Y. Supp. 758 (Sup.
Ct. 1909); see De Met's Inc. v. Insull, 122 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1941); Williams v.
McKay, 46 N.J. Eq. 25, 18 At. 824 (Ch. 1889). Both Kavanaugh and Williams used
the alternate rationale that it was the responsibility of the directors and the committee
members to exercise due care in supervising the committee and also the officers who had
been appointed to manage the corporation on a daily basis.
43. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 38 (1966).
44. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-7 (1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.330 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-31
(1965); cf. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712(c) (McKinney 1963).
45. Most boards of directors in these companies with executive committees meet
quarterly, with a smaller number meeting monthly, twice a month, only as called; and
none meet weekly.
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ings are held only when necessary. Furthermore, board meetings in com-
panies with executive committees were, as a whole, held less frequently
than board meetings in companies without committees."
2. Notice Requirements
In Hayes v. Canada, Atl. & Plant S.S. Co.,47 two of the three executive
committee members walked into the office of the third and commenced a
meeting with their two votes; they amended the by-laws to reduce the com-
mittee membership to two and then authorized payment of salaries to them-
selves. In the suit by the corporation to recover the salaries paid, the
court held non-compliance with the common-law reasonable time notice
requirements for meetings of the board of directors and committees of the
board rendered the executive committee meeting invalid. Furthermore,
the failure to give notice to every member prior to a special committee
meeting will invalidate the committee's action even though a majority of
the committee received notice.4" There is no statutory substitute for this
common-law notice requirement.
In practice, few companies require any notice to be given executive
committee members for regular meetings; of those which do, most require
notice of from one to five days, with 4 expressly requiring the common-
law reasonable notice.
4
3. Quorum Requirements
In the absence of a contrary statutory, charter, or by-law provision, the
general rule for executive committees is the same as for boards of directors"
-a majority of the body constitutes a quorum to transact business.8 In
46. The frequency of board meetings in companies not using executive committees
was most often monthly, with somewhat fewer meeting quarterly, several bi-monthly,
and only 2 "as necessary."
47. 181 Fed. 289 (1st Cir. 1910).
48. Close v. Brictson Mfg. Co., 43 F.2d 869 (D. Neb. 1930); Metropolitan Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Domestic Tel. & Tel. Co., 44 N.J. Eq. 568, 14 At. 907 (Ct. Err. & App.
1888) (casual meeting). See also Wisconsin Town Mut. Reins. Co. v. Calumet County
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 224 Wis. 109, 271 N.W. 51 (1937).
49. As to board of director meetings, nearly one half the respondents reported no
notice requirements for regular board meetings. Of those requiring notice for such meet-
ings, 2 required reasonable notice and 13 required two days notice; the others' require-
ments varied from one to thirty days, sometimes depending on the method of notification
-mail or phone.
50. Marshall v. Industrial Fed'n of America, 84 N.Y. Supp. 866 (App. Term 1903);
see Young v. Canada, At. & Plant S.S. Co., 211 Mass. 453, 97 N.E. 1098 (1912); Bur-
leigh v. Ford, 61 N.H. 360 (1881). But see Tracy v. Guthrie County Agric. Soc'y, 47
Iowa 27 (1877) (alternate ground).
51. Canada-Atlantic & Plant S.S. Co. v. Flanders, 145 Fed. 875 (1st Cir. 1906);
Peurifoy v. Loyal, 154 S.C. 267, 151 S.E. 579 (1930). cf., McNeil v. Boston Chamber
of Commerce, 154 Mass. 277, 28 N.E. 245 (1891) (committee of public body).
Washington University Open Scholarship
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES
determining if the required quorum exists, only those members who are not
interested in the transaction under consideration are counted. 2 Statutes in
Arkansas 3 and Ohio 4 specifically require a majority quorum for valid com-
mittee action, while Massachusetts55 gives the directors the power to deter-
mine committee quorum requirements. The survey indicated that of the 101
companies which had executive committees, 85 required a simple majority
quorum for valid committee action. Of the companies with other com-
mittee quorum requirements, 1 reported that the required quorum was
one-third, several reported that it was one-half, and 5 reported that it
was unanimous attendance.56 The Conference Board Record survey found
that almost all companies had majority quorum requirements but in sev-
eral the requirement was an informal one. For four companies, a quorum
consisted of all the committee members, and one committee reportedly had
no quorum requirements.5".
Although generally formal action by a majority of the quorum is re-
quired to bind the corporation," the courts have, under some circumstances,
52. Marshall v. Industrial Fed'n of America, 84 N.Y. Supp. 866 (App. Term 1903) ;
Peurifoy v. Loyal, 154 S.C. 267, 151 S.E. 579 (1930). See also Metropolitan Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Domestic Tel. & Tel. Co., 44 N.J. Eq. 568, 14 Atl. 907 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888).
53. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306(C) (1966) (unless by-laws or charter provide other-
wise).
54. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.63(D) (Page Supp. 1964) (unless by-laws or
directors specify otherwise).
55. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156B, § 55 (Supp. 1966) (except as otherwise pro-
vided in charter or by-laws).
56. In a majority of cases, these quorum requirements were imposed by a provision
in the corporate by-laws, one each was imposed by the corporate charter and the state cor-
poration law, several were imposed by a board of director resolution, and 3 were im-
posed by the executive committee itself.
Once the required quorum exists, all but two responding companies reported that a
majority of those present can bind the committee, and thereby the corporation; however,
several respondents require that the majority include at least four or at least two non-
employees or at least one-third of the entire committee. One company reported a one-
third requirement for committee action once a quorum existed; however, one company
required unanimous agreement. The like requirement for board of director action was,
similarly, a majority of those constituting the quorum, with only 2 companies requiring
less-one-third of those present.
57. These results can be compared with board of director quorum requirements in
companies having an executive committee, of which nearly two-thirds had majority quo-
rum requirements. Thirteen required only one-third, one required only one-fifth, several
required exactly one-half, and none required unanimous attendance. The board quorum
requirements were almost exclusively imposed by a by-law provision, only 2 being im-
posed by the corporate charter, and eleven by the state corporation law either alone or in
conjunction with by-law and charter requirements.
58. McNeil v. Boston Chamber of Commerce, 154 Mass. 277, 28 N.E. 245 (1891);
Peurifoy v. Loyal, 154 S.C. 267, 151 S.E. 579 (1930).
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held that the majority need not affirmatively act together in order to bind
the corporation; thus, one committee member may act for the committee
if his action receives either actual or tacit approval."' Informal action by
the majority of the quorum may be valid if the committee has customarily
been meeting or acting informally,"° or where it is clear that the committee
approved of the action."' Also, no formal committee action was required
when without a vote it was clear a majority of the committee wanted a
resolution adopted, 2 or when an authorization for a contract was oral
and not in the minutes of the meeting."
Although none of the statutes presently authorize such committee con-
duct, several do allow the committee to act without a formal meeting.6
To prevent abuses of this power by a committee minority, these statutes
limit the circumstances under which a meeting may be avoided by allow-
ing the by-laws or charter 5 of the company to restrict this power, or by
requiring all 6 or a majority 7 of the committee members to agree in writing
to such a procedure."' Thus, even if the committee can act without formally
meeting, the quorum requirements for valid committee action cannot be
circumvented.
4. Miscellaneous
Other questions regarding committee procedure include where the com-
mittee is to meet and whether non-members of the committee are allowed
to attend the meeting. In practice, only 6 of the respondents with executive
comnirttees reported that their committees were authorized to meet only
at the general offices of the corporation. Of the 88 respondents whose
59. John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Barre & Montpelier Traction Power Co., 76 Vt.
131, 56 AtI. 530 (1903); Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co.,
33 Wash. 2d 169, 205 P.2d 597 (1949).
60. Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Cement Co., supra note 59; cf.,
Wingate v. Bercut, 146 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1944).
61. Young v. United States Mortgage & Trust Co., 214 N.Y. 279, 108 N.E. 418
(1915); Title Ins. Co. v. Howell, 158 Va. 713, 164 S.E. 387 (1932).
62. Young v. Schenck, 64 Wash. 90, 116 Pac. 588 (1911).
63. Storer v. Florida Sportservice, Inc., 125 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
64. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306(c) (1966); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(g) (Supp.
1966); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 55 (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
301.28(4)(7) (Supp. 1966); OHIo REV. CoDE ANN. § 1701.63(D) (Page 1964); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-402(7) (Supp. 1966).
65. Pennsylvania only includes by-laws. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-402(7) (Supp.
1966). Massachusetts allows the directors to permit action without meetings. MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 55 (Supp. 1966).
66. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306(c) (1966).
67. Oso REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.63(D) (Page 1964).
68. Massachusetts does not require such a written authorization.
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committees could meet elsewhere, over half indicated that they had done
so, although some responses were qualified by a "rarely do so." Seventy-
five of the companies with executive committees said that directors and
officers who were not committee members were, nevertheless, invited to
attend committee meetings. Of these 75, almost all indicated that these
non-committee members were invited to attend meetings only occassionally.
Several, however, indicated they were invited "often", while 6 indicated
such an invitation had never been extended to non-members. The Con-
ference Board Record survey found a similar invitational practice among
its respondents, who listed board familiarization with committee activi-
ties as the reason for inviting non-member directors, and improved com-
munications between the committee and management as the reason for
inviting non-member officers.
C. Executive Committee Authority
In examining the power of an executive committee to bind the corpo-
ration by its actions, two different problems must be distinguished and
analyzed: (1) If the committee is created for specific purposes, has it acted
in a way which is not authorized by its limited grant of power from the
board of directors? (2) If the grant of power to the committee includes the
full power of the board of directors, is the committee's authority to bind
the corporation legally as great as that of the board?
1. Specific Purpose Committees
a. non-executive standing committees and non-standing executive com-
mittees. Not all committees appointed for limited purposes are executive
committees. Non-standing and temporary committees of the board of
directors are appointed to work in specific areas of the business rather
than to manage the entire business. They receive their grant of authority
from director resolutions which establish the boundaries of their authority.
When such a committee purports to act for the corporation, the court
examines its action to determine if it is within the scope of the committee's
authorized power.69 In Leggett v. New Jersey Mfg. & Banking Co.,70 a
suit to foreclose a mortgage, the corporation based its defense on its finance
committee's lack of authority to mortgage corporate property. The court
upheld this contention on the grounds that a finance committee's powers
are limited to financial affairs, which do not include mortgaging prop-
69. See, e.g., Skinner v. Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co., 140 N.Y.
217, 35 N.E. 491 (1893).
70. 1 N.J. Eq. 541 (Ch. 1832).
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erty.7" Similar inquiry is made, and similar results are reached, when the
committee is a non-standing special committee of the directors. In Greens-
boro Gas Co. v. Home Oil & Gas Co.,72 a committee which was created
and empowered to make an agreement and then report on it to the board
of directors was said to have exceeded its limited authority by agreeing but
failing to report. A committee authorized to purchase land and give a cer-
tain type of corporate note in return was held, in Chestnut-Hill Reservoir
Co. v. Chase,7" not empowered to purchase the land and give a different
type of note.
b. executive committees with advisory powers. The by-laws of one com-
pany with an executive committee which is empowered only to advise
the directors and make recommendations to them based on its studies read:
(2) The Committee shall review any matter affecting the Corpora-
tion and shall formulate and develop major policies of the Corpora-
tion, including policies covering all aspects of the corporate financing,
for submission to the Board of Directors. The Committee may also
inquire, through the President, into any and all aspects of the busi-
ness of the corporation. The Committee shall have no duties or re-
sponsibilities other than those expressly set forth in this resolution.
(3) The Committee shall make recommendations to the Board of
Directors concerning the appointment, duties, and compensation of all
officers and divisional executives of the Corporation....
This company's committee is empowered only to recommend action to
the directors; it can take no action by itself. Five other respondents' com-
mittees were of this general nature; they had authority only to study special
problems designated by the directors and report their findings to the board
of directors along with their recommendations for board action. Some of
the problems studied by these committees were: possibilities of merger or
71. Other cases have held that an auditing committee having the power to pay or
reject claims against the corporation exceeds its authority and therefore does not bind
the corporation when it attempts to rescind a corporate contract, and that a business
committee has no power to issue notes of the corporation. Skinner v. Walter A. Wood
Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co., 140 N.Y. 217, 35 N.E. 491 (1893); Chemical Nat'l
Bank v. Wagner, 93 Ky. 525, 20 S.W. 535 (1892).
72. 222 Pa. 4, 70 AtI. 940 (1908) (dictum).
73. 14 Conn. 123 (1841). Parenthetically, it might be noted that in at least two
cases, committe action was held binding on the corporation only because the powers
given the committee were narrow and for a specific purpose. In Kaufman v. Shoenberg,
33 Del. Ch. 211, 91 A.2d 786 (1952) and Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Del. Ch.
476, 167 A.2d 231 (1962), committee actions establishing the procedures and beneficiaries
of stock option plans were upheld against the attack that under the statute only the board
of directors could issue stock. In both cases, the court found no unauthorized delega-
tion of the director's duty to issue shares because the committees were not to issue the
shares, but were only empowered to determine the terms and beneficiaries of the issuance.
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acquisition, necessity of borrowing or investing funds, and advisability of
declaring dividends. The meetings of one such committee, which was em-
powered to act for the directors, but which in practice only advised it, were
said to "provide the President an opportunity to discuss important policy
matters with the outside Board members."'74
The Conference Board Record survey reported the use of such advisory
committees in "a very few firms." In one such company, the advisory
committee was used to formulate policies, review long-range plans, and
evaluate general operations and development. The National Industrial
Conference survey, in contrast, found the use of advisory committees by
manufacturing companies much more prevalent; they were characterized
as a screening element for the board, a sounding board for the discussion
of future action, or a coordinating and directing tool of management.
Because this type of committee advises its board of directors and does
not purport to act for the corporation, the question of the limits of its
authority to bind the company is moot.7
5
2. General Purpose Committees
It is the general purpose committee which the term "executive commit-
tee" usually connotes; specific purpose committees of the board of direc-
tors are relatively rare. For this reason, general purpose executive com-
mittees are the focal point of the inquiry into the authority of director
committees.
74. The activities of such a committee of a large corporation were described as con-
sidering:
proposed policies, projects and programs relating to the management of the Cor-
poration's business that are submitted to it by the full Board and by members of
top management, for detailed study and review. Formulates recommendations to
the Board and members of management with respect to these matters .... For in-
stance, one of the principal functions of the Committee is the screening and refin-
ing of policies that are to be presented to the full Board, in order to conserve time
of the Board.
75. There is a third type of specific purpose committee-a committee with only those
powers delegated to it from time to time by the directors relating to a specific task or
tasks, such as approving a certain capital expenditure or a departmental budget. At least
three respondents had executive committees which had authority to bind the corporation
only in specific areas. One of these committees had the powers to approve capital ex-
penditures up to a fixed amount and to "take actions to comply with legal requirements;"
another had the power to authorize expenditures and make charitable contributions up to
a stated amount; the third had the powers to fix compensation of officers, open and close
bank accounts, authorize replacement of stock certificates, authorize preparation of docu-
ments, and designate individuals to execute company forms and documents used in
connection with corporate securities. The Conference Board Record survey disclosed
several committees which only had power to perform specifically delegated duties and
several committees whose authority was limited to either a particular period of time or
to certain functions, such as compensation of employees earning more than a stated
amount.
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a. statutes. Most statutes which permit the use of executive committees
also deal with their authority."6 Some of these statutes permit the corpora-
tion to grant the committee "all of the authority of the board of direc-
tors.""7 However, because this is an extremely broad grant of authority
which may include the power to make decisions affecting the very e.istence
of the corporation," all of these statutes either limit or permit the corpora-
tion to limit this authority. Specific powers may be withheld or the commit-
tee may have the authority of the board of directors, but only "to the extent
provided""9 in the by-laws,"0 certificate of incorporation and by-laws,8 '
resolution of the board of directors establishing the committee, 2 resolution
and by-laws," or most commonly, in the resolution, by-laws, and charter.8"
Thus, under these statutes, the directors, shareholders, or both, through
their power to pass or amend by-law or charter provisions, can grant either
full or limited powers to the committee.8 "
When specific powers are denied by statute, the shareholders and direc-
tors may not grant full powers to the committee. Several states legislatively
deny the committee power to amend the articles of incorporation or by-
laws, adopt a plan of merger or consolidation, recommend to the share-
holders a dissolution or a sale, lease, exchange or other disposition of sub-
stantially all the corporate assets (except in the ordinary course in busi-
ness)." Other less extraordinary powers which have been denied include
76. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (c) (Supp. 1966); IowA CODE ANN. § 496A.39
(Supp. 1966.); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 38 (1966). But see HAWAII REV.
LAws §172-97 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 371 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
51-2-14 (1962); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 223 (1959). See also MASS. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 156B, § 55 (Supp. 1966) (directors may delegate some or all of their powers).
77. Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.330 (1959); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 38
(1966).
78. See Fensterer v. Pressure Lighting Co., 85 Misc. 621, 149 N.Y. Supp. 49 (N.Y.
City Ct. 1914).
79. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-5-7 (1963); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
§ 38 (1966).
80. NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.125 (1963).
81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:7-4 (1937).
82. McH. STAT. ANN. § 21.13( 4 )(c) (1963).
83. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.330 (1959).
84. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 712(a) (McKinney 1963); Tzx. Bus. CORP. ACT
art. 2.36 (1956).
85. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 241, 242 (Supp. 1966); ABA-ALI MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 25, 54 (1966).
86. IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.39 (Supp. 1966); MsS. CODE ANN. § 5309-77 (Supp.
1966); ORE. REv. STAT. § 57.206 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.11 (Supp. 1966);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.400 (Supp. 1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17.36,37
(1965); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 38 (1966). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. §
64-306 (A) (6) (1966).
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the power to: elect officers, 7 fill vacancies on the board of directors" or
the committee," declare dividends,"0 authorize the issuance of stock, 1 call
shareholders meetings," fix committee member compensation,9 3 repeal or
alter a director resolution declared to be non-amendable, 9 recommend to
shareholders any proposition requiring their approval," change the prin-
cipal office of the corporation," remove officers or directors,9" authorize
reacquisition of stock,98 and create new classes of stock.99 The areas of
authority denied are generally those over which the legislatures have felt
the directors alone should have power because of their importance to the
corporation.' It should be noted that the statutorily denied powers are
minimum limitations on committee authority; nothing would prevent the
shareholders or directors from denying other powers.
b. cases.
i. ratification and estoppel. In discussing the judicially imposed limits
on the authority of an executive committee granted full board powers,
some cases have relied on ratification of committee action as the basis of
87. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306(A)(1) (1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 55(e) (Supp. 1966);
S.D. CODE § 11.0707 (1939); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.36 (Supp. 1967).
88. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306(A) (1) (1966); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B,
§ 55(f) (Supp. 1966); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712(2) (McKinney 1963); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.63(A) (Page 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.36 (Supp. 1967).
89. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306(A)(1) (1966); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712a(2)
(McKinney 1963); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.63(A) (Page 1964); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.36 (Supp. 1967).
90. CAL. CORP. CODE § 822 (Deering 1962); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 59 (1966); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 156B, § 55(h) (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.36 (Supp. 1967).
91. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306(A) (3) (1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 59 (1966);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 55(c) (Supp. 1966).
92. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-306(A)(4) (1966).
93. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 712(3) (McKinney 1963).
94. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 712(5) (McKinney 1963).
95. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 59 (1966); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712(1) (McKin-
ney 1963).
96. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 55(a) (Supp. 1966).
97. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.38 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 156B, § 55(g) (Supp. 1966).
98. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 55(i) (Supp. 1966).
99. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B § 55(d) (Supp. 1966).
100. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 38, comment (1966).
101. Comment, Corporations-The Executive Committee and Corporate Organiza-
tion-Scope of Powers, 42 MicH. L. REv. 133, 145 (1942).
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its validity." 1 Upon the familiar agency ground that subsequent ratifica-
tion by a principal makes an otherwise unauthorized act of an agent bind-
ing upon the principal," 2 acts of committees have been held ratified by
directors'03 or shareholders' so as to bind the corporation. Thus, the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy,' the fixing of tolls to use corporate
streams,' the giving of security for a loan, 0 the mortgaging of corporate
property,0 8 the employing of a collection attorney,0 9 the joining of a rein-
surance group,"0 the assigning of a bond and mortgage by a bank,' 1' and
the executing of corporate contracts" 2 have been upheld on a ratification
theory against the allegation that the act of the committee under con-
sideration was beyond its authorized power. Even a lease of corporate
property to another corporation for 999 years was upheld when ratified
by shareholders." 3 In addition, a similar agency principle, estoppel, has
been used to prevent a board of directors from denying the existence of an
executive committee's authority to act after the corporation had accepted
the benefits of the unauthorized act."' Although these validation processes,
ratification and estoppel, will protect those dealing with executive com-
mittees, and are arguably valuable to commercial intercourse,1 " their
presence in a case relegates any discussion of committee authority to state-
ments of dictum, or at best, alternate holdings. Thus, cases based on these
theories do not necessarily establish precedent upon the basis of which com-
mittee authority problems can be solved.
ii. agency theory. It is possible to view the relationship between the
shareholders, the board of directors, and the executive committee of a
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 82, 93 (1957).
103. E.g., Boyce v. Chemical Plastics, Inc., 175 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
338 U.S. 828 (1949).
104. E.g., Cabot, Inc. v. Gas Prods. Co., 93 Mont. 497, 19 P.2d 878 (1933).
105. Boyce v. Chemical Plastics, Inc., 175 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
828 (1949).
106. Black River Improvement Co. v. Holway, 85 Wis. 344, 55 N.W. 418 (1893).
107. Cabot, Inc. v. Gas Prods. Co., 93 Mont. 497, 19 P.2d 878 (1933).
108. Burrill v. President, Nabant Bank, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 163 (1840).
109. Bums v. Valley Bank, 94 Cal. App. 254, 271 Pac. 107 (1928).
110. Wisconsin Town Mut. Reins. Co. v. Calumet County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 224
Wis. 109, 271 N.W. 51 (1937).
111. Palmer v. Yates, 3 Sandf. (N.Y.) 137 (Super. Ct. 1849).
112. Metropolitan Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Domestic Tel. & Tel. Co., 44 N.J. Eq. 568, 14
At. 907 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888).
113. Union Pac. Ry. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 163 U.S. 564 (1895).
114. Tilden v. Goldy Mach. Co., 9 Cal. App. 9, 98 Pac. 39 (1908).
115. Comment, Corporations-The Executive Committee in Corporate Organization-
Scope of Powers, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 133, 145 (1942). This is aside from its value as a
corporate counselling tool to insure valid committee action.
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corporation as that of principal-agent-subagent, with authority being dele-
gated to the directors who re-delegate it to the committee." 6 If such is
the case, the agency principle, that one who has been delegated a power
involving non-mechanical tasks cannot, in the absence of agreement, re-
delegate it,"' could result in an inability on the part of the directors to
delegate any authority to the committee. Several early cases which so
viewed the corporation invalidated any delegation of power by the board."'
The weight of authority, however, upheld delegation of power to a com-
mittee upon the rationale that the powers of the directors were both dele-
gated and original." 9
Neither of the agency-based positions is currently used by the courts.
Other than a brief mention of this theory in some later cases, 20 it has
been discarded in favor of theories which view director committees as
sui generis and attempt to deal with what ought to be the limits of their
authority. The statutory acceptance of executive committees rendered
obsolete the views which denied the power of the directors to delegate
authority. 2 '
iii. ordinary business limitations. Statutory language 2 which establishes
the authority of executive committees as "all the authority of the board
of directors,""' has not pre-empted judicial consideration of whether
executive committees can act for and on behalf of the corporation in any
situation in which the board of directors can act. It is this problem with
116. Comment, Corporations-The Executive Committee in Corporate Organization
-Scope of Powers, 42 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1942).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 18 (1957).
118. Gillis v. Bailey, 21 N.H. 149 (1850); Despatch Line of Packets v. Bellamy Mfg.
Co., 12 N.H. 205 (1841).
119. Burrill v. President, Nahant Bank, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 163 (1840); Manson v.
Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918); Hoyt v. Thompson's Executor, 19 N.Y. 207
(1859); Helms v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 129 Tex. 121, 103 S.W.2d 128 (1937).
See also Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 170 N.Y. 505, 63 N.E. 554 (1902) (dictum).
120. E.g., Helms v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 129 Tex. 121, 103 S.W.2d 128
(1937).
121. But see section on ministerial tasks, notes 137-143 infra and accompanying text.
The doctrine of non-delegation by an agent to a subagent was, even in the early cases,
subject to the exception which allowed such delegation if it were agreed to by the prin-
cipal. The statutory allowance of the use of such committees which was reflected in cor-
porate charters and by-laws brings the exception into effect even if the courts today were
to hold to this agency view of the corporation.
122. Typical by-law and charter provisions are similarly worded. NATIONAL INDUS-
TRIAL CONFERENCE BD. & AMERICAN SoC'Y OF CORPORATE SECRETARIES, CORPORATE
DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES 112, 114 (1962).
123. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712 (McKinney 1963); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 38 (1960).
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which the courts have been primarily concerned in determining executive
committee authority. In Lawrence v. Atlantic Paper & Pulp Corp.,124 the
corporate charter granted the executive committee all the powers of the
board of directors, and the committee filed a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy which the plaintiff sought to set aside as not having been filed
pursuant to a director resolution. The court held that because of the
charter provision the committee had become the substitute of the board
of directors. This position has been adopted in only a few cases . 21
The majority view, that the "full powers of the board of directors"
conferred upon executive committees is not without some limitation, is
presented in the leading case of Hayes v. Canada, Atl. & Plant S.S. Co.2
The corporation was suing its president, a director and a member of the
executive committee, to recover salary and expense payments which, along
with by-law changes, had been authorized by the executive committee.
In affirming a judgment for the corporation, the court noted that its
decision could have been based on the fact that reasonable notice had not
been given to a third committee member; it nevertheless went on to chal-
lenge the defendant's contention that the executive committee had the
authority to approve the payments and make the by-law changes by virtue
of another by-law which gave the committee the full powers of the direc-
tors. The court reasoned:
Section 8 [of the by-laws] is expressed literally in very broad terms,
in that it purports to vest the committee with the "full powers" of
the board of directors. Hayes maintains that this expression "full
powers" has no limitation whatever, while a true construction limits
it to the ordinary business operations of the corporation.
... [T]hey proceeded in such a way that, if their actions had been
124. 298 Fed. 246 (5th Cir. 1924).
125. Lawrence v. Atlantic Paper & Pulp Corp., 298 Fed. 246 (5th Cir. 1924), Hal-
deman v. Haldeman, 176 Ky. 635, 197 S.W. 376 (1917); Sheridan Elec. Light Co. v.
Chatham Nat'l Bank, 127 N.Y. 517, 28 N.E. 467 (1891). See Palmer v. Yates, 3 Sandf.
(N.Y.) 137 (Super. Ct. 1849) (dictum). The Supreme Court accepted this view in a
dictum in Union Pac. Ry. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 163 U.S. 564 (1895),
by upholding a 999 year lease of a railroad right of way entered into by an executive
committee. The Court held that since the contracts were in the proper form, approved
by an executive committee which had all the powers of the board of directors, and rati-
fied by the shareholders, the corporation was bound. In the course of the decision, em-
phasis was placed on the fact that the shareholders had authorized delegation of full
board powers to an executive committee by adopting such a by-law and that therefore
the committee had received from the shareholders the authority to do anything the board
could, including entering into the instant contract. See also Ford v. Magee, 160 F.2d
457 (2d Cir. 1947).
126. 181 Fed. 289 (1st Cir. 1910).
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effectual, the two men, acting in their own pecuniary interests, would
have absorbed the entire powers of the corporation for an indefinite
period .... It is certainly intolerable to maintain that the words "full
powers," . .. practically divested the directors of all their functions,
and built up a new foundation for it in lieu of that formally estab-
lished .... [W]e must hold that the matter of such compensation
was specifically retained for the personal action of the directors ...
notwithstanding that there were other powers, of a general nature,
which might well have vested in the executive committee, which
would fully satisfy the call of the words "full powers."'127
Courts which place this judicial gloss on the phrase "full powers" have
usually interpreted "ordinary business" to include only those decisions
which are necessary to carry on the day-to-day operations of the corpora-
tion.
The rationale behind the "ordinary business" limitation seeks to prevent
the committee from initiating radical departures from fundamental corpo-
rate policies and methods of doing business established by the board of
directors. Courts following this rationale have held invalid the execution
of a contract providing for control of corporate management by another
corporation,'128 the execution of a contract to purchase the corporation's
own stock in order to maintain its price during merger negotiations," 9 and
the removal of officers elected by the board of directors.' However, one
court has indicated that it might consider such an apparently extraordinary
act as buying out a competitor to be part of a company's ordinary busi-
ness.'
3 1
Other examples of committee action which the courts have found to be
within the ordinary business of the corporation and therefore authorized
by a "full powers" delegation include contracting to purchase wire for a
127. Id. at 292-93 (emphasis added).
128. Robinson v. Benbow, 298 Fed. 561 (4th Cir. 1924).
129. Maryland Trust Co. v. National Mechanics' Bank, 102 Md. 608, 63 At. 70
(1906) ("usual" business limitation).
130. Fensterer v. Pressure Lighting Co., 85 Misc. 621, 149 N.Y. Supp. 49 (N.Y. City
Ct. 1914); see Tempel v. Dodge, 89 Tex. 69, 32 S.W. 514 (1895), in which the Texas
Supreme Court held a by-law granting the executive committee the full powers of the
board null and void as in conflict with a charter provision imposing management of the
corporation on the directors, because the directors could delegate authority to conduct
only ordinary corporate business in the face of such a charter provision; cf. Crenshaw v.
Barbour, 162 Tenn. 235, 36 S.W.2d 87 (1931).
131. Metropolitan Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Domestic Tel. & Tel. Co., 44 N.J. Eq. 568, 14
At. 907 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888) (dictum).
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traction company,"' appointing an agent,'33 accelerating a mortgage and
appointing a new trustee under a deed of trust,"3 4 transferring shares of
stock owned by a holding company,,' and employing a superintendent of
a branch of the company's business.'36
iv. ministerial task limitation. Results comparable to those of the "ordi-
nary business" limitation cases are reached by courts which hold an
agency view of the corporation-director relationship. 37 They apply the
agency principle l that, absent express authorization, the board of direc-
tors, as an agent, can redelegate only ministerial powers-those whose
exercise require no discretion. While there are statements to this effect in
several cases involving committee action,3 9 few cases have been decided
on this point alone. 4' These cases indicate discretionary action is to be
taken only by the board.
The limitations imposed on executive committee authority by the minis-
terial task rationale may be identical to those imposed by the previously
discussed "ordinary business" rationale. That is, if ordinary business acts
132. John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Barre & Montpelier Traction Power Co., 76 Vt.
131, 56 At. 530 (1903) (dictum).
133. Canada-Atlantic & Plant S.S. Co. v. Flanders, 145 Fed. 875 (1st Cir. 1906).
The nature of the contract and size of the company are the factors to be used in de-
termining if the action is in the company's ordinary business or is of a matter of funda-
mental importance to the company. Expressing its hesitation about giving committees
full director powers the court said, "... we do not wish to have it understood that we
are committed to the legality of the constitution of an executive committee in which
should be vested all the powers of the board of directors of a corporation. Respectable
authors seem to be divided on that proposition." Id. at 879.
134. Helms v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 129 Tex. 121, 103 S.W.2d 128 (1937).
135. Wingate v. Bercut, 146 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1944).
136. Young v. Canada, Atl. & Plant S.S. Co., 211 Mass. 453, 97 N.E. 1098 (1912).
The court stated that the nature of the company's business allowed a delegation of
authority to act in the area of ordinary business, thereby implying that some corporations,
because of the business they conducted, could not even delegate this quantum of author-
ity to a committee. Id. at 456, 97 N.E. at 1099.
137. See notes 116-121 supra and accompanying text.
138. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 18 (1957) provides "unless otherwise
agreed, an agent cannot properly delegate to another the excercise of discretion in the
use of a power held for the benefit of the principal." See Farmer's Mutual Fire Ins. Co.
v. Chase, 56 N.H. 341 (1876).
139. Metropolitan Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Domestic Tel. & Tel. Co., 44 N.J. Eq. 568, 14
Ati. 907 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888); John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Barre & Montpelier
Traction Power Co., 76 Vt. 131, 56 At]. 530 (1903); Young v. Schenck, 64 Wash. 90,
116 Pac. 588 (1911).
140. In First Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Travellers' Home Ass'n, 108 App. Div. 78,
95 N.Y. Supp. 454 (1905), aff'd. 185 N.Y. 575, 78 N.E. 1103 (1906), this rationale was
an alternate ground for the decision. The court held that the execution of a note for a
debt of the corporation was a ministerial, as opposed to a discretionary, task and therefore
could be validly delegated to a committee.
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are interpreted to be acts requiring no discretion, then the results reached
under both rationales would be the same.""' However, the ministerial task
rationale would seem to be more restrictive; even if all non-discretionary
acts are in the ordinary business of the corporation,' 4 ' there could very
likely be ordinary business acts the performance of which requires discre-
tion. For example, entering into a contract may be a routine business act,
but deciding on its terms would be more than a ministerial task in that it
could require the exercise of discretion.'
v. duration of authority. Granted the existence of an executive commit-
tee's authority, there are times when that authority cannot be validly
exercised. Several statutes.. and many corporate by-laws 1 provide that
the committee shall have the powers of the board of directors between the
meetings of the board. Such language in the statute granting authority to
the committee is construed literally. In Commercial Wood & Cement Co.
v. Northampton Portland Cement Co.,'46 the defendant corporation's
executive committee had approved the contract sued upon, but had done
so at a meeting held two hours prior to a board of directors meeting which
had previously been called. The court affirmed a dismissal of the com-
plaint on the ground that the executive committee which had authorized
the contract had acted without authority, the calling of the directors meet-
ing having suspended the powers of the executive committee to act. By
calling the director's meeting, the session of the directors had begun and
during this period the executive committee could not, without usurping
the director's powers, act in managing the affairs of the corporation.
vi. delegation of authority by the committee. The question of whether
an executive committee can delegate its powers arises in those infrequent
instances when the committee attempts to exercise its authorized powers
141. See John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Barre & Montpelier Traction Power Co., 76
Vt. 131, 56 At. 530 (1903).
142. It would seem that all ministerial tasks would be ones performed in the ordinary
business of the corporation. However, this would not be true of ministerial tasks which
are necessary to carry out an extraordinary business decision. For example, the act of
redeeming stock may be completely ministerial; however, it is possible that the only time
the company will perform this act is pursuant to dissolution, an extraordinary occurrence.
143. See Metropolitan Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Domestic Tel. & Tel. Co., 44 N.J. Eq. 568,
14 Ad. 907 (Ct. Err. & App. 1888). It might be noted that the ministerial task rationale
was used before the ordinary business rationale was developed. See San Antonio Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W.2d 650 (1937).
144. E.g., ARx. STAT. ANN. 64-306(B) (1966).
145. This was reported by a majority of the companies responding to the survey.
146. 190 N.Y. 1, 82 N.E. 730 (1907).
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through an agent, usually a member of the committee.14 The only re-
ported cases 48 directly involving delegation of authority by an executive
committee arose in New York before 1900, and despite one early state-
ment to the contrary,'49 the New York courts have allowed the committee
to act through an agent provided the task performed is one which entails
no discretion or judgment, a ministerial task such as endorsing checks.'
c. current corporate practice.
i. "full power" committees. Of the responding companies which had
executive committees, forty per cent, 39 of 101, reported that their com-
mittees were granted the full powers of the board of directors while the
board was not in session. Such a grant was contained in the corporation's
charter, by-laws, or in the director resolution establishing the committee. A
typical by-law provision granted this type of authority to an executive com-
mittee is:
During the intervals between sessions of the Board, the Executive
Committee shall have, and may exercise, all the powers of the Board
in the management of the business and affairs of the Corporation,
including the power to authorize the seal of the Corporation to be
affixed to all papers which may require it, in such manner as the
Executive Committee shall deem for the best interests of the Corpora-
tion .... 151
A few of these respondents, however, indicated that although their
executive committees were authorized to perform any acts which their
147. E.g., Sheridan Elec. Light Co. v. Chatham Nat'l Bank, 127 N.Y. 517, 28 N.E.
467 (1891).
148. Sheridan Elec. Light Co. v. Chatham Natl Bank, 127 N.Y. 517, 28 N.E. 467
(1891); Olcott v. Tioga R.R., 27 N.Y. 546 (1863); Caldwell v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n, 53 App. Div. 245, 65 N.Y. Supp. 826 (1900). See also Young v. United
States Mortgage & Trust Co., 214 N.Y. 279, 108 N.E. 418 (1915).
149. Olcott v. Tioga R.R., 27 N.Y. 546 (1863) (dictum).
150. Compare Sheridan Elec. Light Co. v. Chatham Nat'l Bank, 127 N.Y. 517, 28
N.E. 467 (1891) with Caldwell v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 53 App. Div. 245,
65 N.Y. Supp. 826 (1900).
151. Another by-law in the words of the governing statute provides: "The Executive
Committee shall have and may exercise all and any of the powers of the Board of Direc-
tors in the management of the business and affairs of the Corporation during the intervals
between the meetings of the Board of Directors. .. ."
A third shows its committee has power to advise and recommend as well as to act for
the board:
The Executive Committee shall represent the Board of Directors between meetings
for the purpose of consulting with the officers and giving special consideration to
matters of importance affecting the policies, financing, management and operations
of the business, and taking action thereon or making recommendations to the
Board....
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board of directors were capable of performing, in practice there were
limitations on this authority. Thus, even though one committee was
granted full board powers, all major decisions, such as declaration of divi-
dends, were reserved for board action. Several other committees exercised
full board powers only when "an important urgent decision" was needed
or when "pressing business matters" occurred between board meetings.
This latter type of committee is, in effect, an emergency committee acting
only to fill an immediate corporate need and not as a substitute for the
board of directors.
Although most of the companies whose committees were granted full
board powers did not elaborate on the types of activities their committees
undertook, a study of those who did may help to define the limits of
such a grant. A few stated that the full powers were used only to trans-
act routine corporate business not affecting general corporate policy and
to make recommendations to the board in areas beyond this limit. Two
indicated their committees exercised their full board powers to review
regularly the operations and growth of the company and to approve
divisional budgets-a somewhat limited range of activities. Two others
indicated that their committees limited themselves to ordinary, routine,
or ministerial tasks and the performance of activities such as the limited
appropriation of funds, construction of facilities, election of personnel,
purchase of land, purchase of equipment and its financing, approval of
expenditures contracts and leases in excess of management's authority,
financial analysis, and the submission of recommendations to the board in
those areas beyond the ordinary course of the company's business. The
most detailed list of tasks performed by a "full power" executive committee
given in the survey was:
Review corporate investment objectives; review proposed capital
budget, and budget additions in excess of a stated amount or which
may lead to substantial future investment or involve a change in
policy; review proposed plans for financial assistance to affiliates; re-
view matters on which an operating division seeks guidance, such as
unusual contractual or financial terms which may set important prece-
dents, investments in new lines of business or areas-ventures involving
outside participation or other exceptional features, terms of settling
claims or litigation, and exceptions to policy; review reports on
treasury stock acquisition program; organize and appoint members
to specialized committees; and decide important corporate matters
not requiring action by the board, such as acquisition, lease and sale,
transfer, or other disposition of property or assets, retainer budgets
and additions to contribution budgets, amendments to Company
policy not reserved to the board, insurance programs, public rela-
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tions, granting of proxies and other actions requiring documentation
of authority to third parties.
Even this wide-ranging list of duties was, however, prefaced with a state-
ment that matters involving "major policy considerations or large financial
considerations" would be referred to the board. Thus, it appears that, in
practice, executive committee authority to act for the corporation usually
is within the ordinary business limitation imposed by the courts. 2
The National Industrial Conference survey reported that 40% of its
manufacturing corporations placed no limitations on the authority of their
executive committees in their corporate charter or by-laws. However, more
than three-quarters indicated that there were some limitations imposed
by charter, by-laws, statutes, or board of director resolution. That survey
further found that the by-laws of most large companies specifically pro-
vided for full board powers in an executive committee.
ii. "'denied power" committees. Of the 101 responding companies with
executive committees, 36 stated that their committees were given the full
power of the board of directors subject to certain specific limitations im-
posed by their charter, by-laws, or the director resolution establishing the
committee. A by-law of this type reads:
... The Executive Committee shall have and may exercise, during
the intervals between meetings of the Board, all the powers of the
Board of Directors in the management of the business and affairs of
the Corporation, . . . but the Executive Committee shall not have
power to fill vacancies in the Board, or to change the membership of
or to fill vacancies in the committee, or to make or amend the by-
laws of the Corporation.
To the same effect is a board of directors resolution establishing an execu-
tive committee which:
shall have ... the full powers of the board of directors in the man-
agement of the business and affairs of the Corporation in the intervals
between the meetings of the board of directors . . . except that the
Executive Committee shall not have the power to act on any of the
following; (a) Adoption, amendment and repeal of the by-laws ....
The powers denied an executive committee of this type most often
include the declaration of dividends, amendment or repeal of the corporate
152. In the survey, several companies' executive committees were specifically re-
stricted by the instruments creating them to the "ordinary and regular business and affairs
of the company" except as other duties and powers were specifically granted to them by
the direttorg.
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by-laws, election or removal of corporate officers, directors, or executive
committee members, filling of board or committee vacancies, changes in
the number of directors, and the remuneration of directors, officers or
committee members. Other areas in which committees were less frequently
denied the power to act were: approval of mergers, consolidations, or
acquisitions; issuance of capital stock; approval of expenditures or indebt-
edness involving more than a stated dollar amount; action requiring sub-
mission of proposals to the shareholders for approval; appointment or
discharge of other director committees; amendment or repeal of a director
resolution which by its terms is not amendable or repealable; negation of an
act of the board of directors; approval of final budgets; and amendment of
the certificate of incorporation. Another company's by-laws forbade among
other powers any action which the chairman of the board of directors or
president had designated as a matter to be considered by the Board.
Moreover, several other companies' committees were prohibited from acting
in areas reserved to another director committee, such as a finance com-
mittee.
The functions performed by "denied power" executive committees
ranged from those performed by merely advisory executive committees to
those performed by "full power" executive committees. For example, ad-
visory committee actions were performed by several committees of this
type-developing corporate policy and recommending it to the board for
their action, and ". . . reviewing and considering business matters and
making suggestions to the Board of Directors." One company reported that
its committee gave managerial advice to the officers of the corporation
when the board was not in session, while several "denied power" executive
committees acted within their limits and also provided advice to the board
concerning "decisions on matters of business policy . . . , studies . . . of
problems and possible solutions and ... recommendations to the Board for
final decision."
A few companies, on the other hand, indicated that their "denied power"
committee acted in more than an advisory capacity and functioned in prac-
tice like a committee delegated only certain duties and powers-a "specific
purpose" committee. One such company replied that its committee
acted ". . . when an important matter has previously been discussed by the
full board which has suggested the Executive Committee dispose of the
matter in accordance with the Board's line of thinking." Other companies
replied that one function of their committee was to act in emergency cir-
cumstances. Finally, there were those companies which indicated that the
action taken by their "denied power" committees was similar to the action
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taken by "full power" committees. Such action included: review of
budgets; approval of purchase or sale of corporate property; acquisition of
financing for the purchase of such property; approval of labor agreements,
charitable contributions, and contracts which the officers had no authority
to make; authorization to affix the corporate seal or to comply with
statutory or other formal requirements; and approval of loans or invest-
ments. As with "full power" committees, the emphasis here also was
on the routine or ordinary business nature of the committee action. This
was summed up in the statement that a particular committee
acts upon all matters of corporate business which are of a somewhat
routine nature though requiring action by the Board of Directors
or Executive Committee. Only the most important matters requiring
corporate action are presented to the Board of Directors for approval
or authorization.
CONCLUSION
Today between three-fifths and three-fourths of all corporations use
executive committees as an aid to their boards of directors 53 -the frequency
of committee use increasing with the size of the company." 4 This cor-
respondence is particularly apparent when number of operating divisions
is used to measure company size."' The survey also indicated a difference
in committee use among industries, presumably because there are general
differences among industries in company size, complexity, and geographical
spread." 6 When classified according to industry, the survey results showed
that companies in the financial (including insurance) and transportation
industries had higher executive committee incidence than companies of
the other industry groups represented.
Presumably because their relative size underlies their usefulness, executive
committees are generally smaller bodies than boards of directors. "7 Three-
153. These figures are based on the assumption that the results are representative of
the entire corporate economy. The Conference Board Record survey found a 70% use
factor, the National Industrial Conference survey a 74% factor, and the author's survey
a 65% factor.
154. See Appendix C. This relationship is confirmed by both the Conference Board
Record survey which, by using number of employees as the sole measure of size, found
that 49% of the companies with 1,000 employees or less had an executive committee
while 97% of those with over 25,000 employees had such a committee, and the National
Industrial Conference survey which, by using total assets as the size measure, reported that
47% of manufacturing companies in the under ten million dollar asset group employed
executive committees while 82% in the $500 to $999 million range and 94% in the over
one billion dollar group had such committees.
155. See Appendix B.
156. Appendix D shows the use of executive committees by industry.
157. See Appendix E.
Washington University Open Scholarship
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES
fourths of the executive committees surveyed had a membership in the
3 to 6 range, with 5 members being the most common size, because as an
odd number it eliminates committee deadlocks and makes for a manageable
group. The boards of directors in those companies which did not have an
executive committee were, as a group, smaller than boards in companies
with executive committees,15 further reinforcing the theory that the use of
executive committees is dependent on the size and work load of the board of
directors.159
A related area is the inside-outside makeup of the committee and the
board; that is, the relative number of officers who are committee members
or directors. Executive committees evidenced a more inside-oriented compo-
sition than did boards of directors, presumably because they run the com-
pany more directly and are more concerned with day-to-day operational
problems.'
The most prevelant reason given for the creation and use of an execu-
tive committee was the need for someone with authority to determine cor-
porate policy and make routine operating decisions when the board of
directors is not in session,' 61 but this is not the sole criterion for determining
158. See Appendices F and G.
159. Also, executive committees met more frequently than boards of directors. The
committee's function of supervising daily corporate business accounts for this difference
as well as for the disparity between frequency of director meetings in companies with
executive committees and in those without executive committes. Boards in the latter
companies met more often than those which used committees-reflecting the committee's
function as the day-to-day operator and overseer of the corporation.
160. The executive committee was composed wholly of corporate directors in all but
11 of the 101 surveyed companies having such a committee. Of these 11 companies
none were incorporated in the minority of states which do not require all members of
the executive committee to be corporate directors. In addition, a majority of executive
committees were composed of either all or a majority of inside directors, directors who are
also corporate officers, or an equal number of inside and outside directors. In only 2
instances were there no inside directors on the committee and in nearly one-fourth of the
committees inside directors constituted the entire membership. The Conference Board
Record survey showed that 31 % of its reporting companies' executive committees con-
sisted of all inside directors, 20% had a majority of inside directors, 7% an equal num-
ber of inside and outside directors, and only 1 % no inside directors at all. Furthermore,
it found that inside directors constituted all or a majority of the committee in those
instances when the committee met at least once a month or its company had relatively
few employees.
161. A "need for policy decisions at more frequent intervals," a "need for corporate
action between regular Board meetings," a way "to provide facility of operations be-
tween board meetings," and "a recognition of the need to provide for decisions concern-
ing the affairs of the corporation during those interim periods when the board is not in
session" were typical of the responses in this category. One company, emphasizing this
interval problem said, "Because of quarterly meetings of the Board of Directors, it was
felt necessary for the Executive Committee to meet during interim periods to assist of-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1967/iss1/7
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
whether to use a committee. Another reason, emphasized by a somewhat
smaller group of replies, was the desire for greater management control
over the affairs of the company; in somewhat related responses, several
of the surveyed companies indicated that their growth in size and com-
plexity had led to the creation and use of the committee 62 In addition,
other companies cited the need for prompt action on certain matters and
the possibility that emergencies would arise when the board could not
act.163 This need for prompt action was underscored by some respondent
companies whose directors were in different cities and unable to meet on
short notice when an immediate decision was needed-an executive com-
mittee composed of the in-town directors could almost always meet as
needed.
Once the decision to use an executive committee has been made, cor-
porate counsel must carefully deal with several problems connected with
committee use-its creation, operation, and powers. Since the board of
directors is elected by the shareholders to run the corporation and is prob-
ably in the best position to judge the corporation's need for an executive
committee, it is logical that it should be given the power to create such a
committee. However, because the appointment of an executive committee
may indirectly alter shareholder representation in corporate decisions, ex-
press by-law or charter authorization for committee use seems indicated
so that the shareholders may, by voting on the by-law or charter, exercise
some power over the decision to create it. This is the position taken by
the Model Act and many statutes,"' and was generally found in the re-
spondent companies.
Other committee creation problems center around the statutory re-
quirements as to the number and kind of members appointed to the com-
mittee. Compliance with these requirements are conditions precedent to
valid committee action. Aside from appointing the statutory number of
ficers and act on behalf of the Board." Another group of replies indicated that the large
volume of day-to-day or routine business which required director action led to the crea-
tion of a committee to ease this work load. One such reply stated, "The committee takes
care of routine matters which would otherwise require Board action."
162. This relationship is to be expected, for as the corporation increases in size, the
work load and membership of its board of directors increase, and as that happens, the
board becomes more difficult to convene and a less effective management body. Ap-
pendices B and C show this relationship.
163. Reasons given less frequently for committee existence include: the size of the
board of directors; the need for flexibility convenience, or better communications; the
fact that state law allowed the formation of such a committee; and the desire to have a
body to study operations and make recommendations to the board of directors, or
to provide approval for officer decisions.
164. E.g., ABA-ALI. MODSL Bus. CORP. ACT § 38 (1966).
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members, usually two or three, the resolution creating the committee must
require that all committee members be directors. The rationale behind the
latter requirement is that the directors, chosen by the shareholders to run
their company, must compose any other group which is entrusted with
the operation of the corporation. In the majority states whose statutes in-
clude such a limitation on member selection, care must be exercised to
comply with this requirement. In those states which do not at present
have such a statutory requirement, future questions could be avoided by
appointing only directors to the executive committee.'65 Those respondents
incorporated in the majority rule states which indicated that their commit-
tees were not composed solely of directors are inviting attacks on future
commitee decisions.
The operation of the committee is the responsibility of the directors; as
an instrument of the board of directors, an executive committee should be
supervised by the board. Although there is no need for such extensive
director control over the committee that it cannot perform its functions
without the approval of the directors, some form of direct or indirect con-
trol to assure that the committee operates in a way the directors and
shareholders intended is clearly appropriate.'66 Such committee control,
regardless of its form, is underscored by the statutory codification of the
common-law principle that although directors can delegate to a committee
their powers to act in a given area, they cannot delegate their responsibility
in that area.
Even though there are usually no statutory notice requirements, and the
respondents' by-law and charter provisions were generally silent on this
point, cases impose a common-law requirement of reasonable notice on
director or committee meetings and limit the possibilities of dispensing
with such notice. In addition, the common-law requirement that for valid
committee action a majority constitutes a quorum applies to executive
committee meetings when not embodied in an executive committee statute.
This requirement and the rule that generally only a majority of that
quorum need agree on a course of action for the committee to act prevents
a lone dissenter from blocking effective committee action. Another com-
165. If non-member's views are regarded as desirable before the committee acts, in-
viting officers or non-member directors to committee meetings would accomplish the
result without endangering the validity of committee action.
166. This control might take the form of director veto power over committee action,
a somewhat drastic form of supervision; informal control through director consultation
with committee members; control through delimitation by directors of the areas in which
the committee can act; and control through a careful review of committee action by the
board of directors serving as a guide rather than a veto power.
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mittee expedient is allowing informal meetings through which the com-
mittee can act. This is desirable for it allows flexibility; however, the
power must be limited to prevent unauthorized committee minorities from
making important corporate decisions.'
There are two types of committee power authorizations in the most
commonly used type of executive committee-the "full power of the
board of directors" committee. One allows the committee to exercise
all the powers of the board of directors except those reserved to the di-
rectors in the corporate by-laws or charter. The other allows the committee
to exercise all the powers of the board of directors except those which the
executive committee statute specifically denies. The former type has the
advantage of permitting the shareholders to choose the powers they wish
to deny their committee. This affords flexibility by allowing the company
to shape its committee's powers to its special needs. In large companies
today, the proxy system may make the power illusory, so that a combina-
tion of the two types might well be advisable; such a combination would
enable the company to combine committee power flexibility with the pro-
tection afforded the shareholders by the denial type statute. With such an
authorization, the more important director powers could be denied the
committee statutorily and the shareholders could choose from among the
remaining director powers those which they wish their committee to be
able to exercise.
Regardless of the type of committee power authorization, the courts will
be concerned with the meaning of the phrase "full powers of the board
of directors." The majority of the courts have taken the position that this
phrase is not all embracing, and they limit "full power" committees to
decisions affecting only the ordinary course of the corporation's business and
to the performance of ministerial functions. These limitations protect the
interests of the shareholders by preventing the executive committee from
radically changing the nature of the corporation or ending its life. The
cases which limit the powers of the committee must still be considered by
corporate counsel, for although the statutes are in terms of "full powers
of the board of directors," this ordinary business limitation will likely be
engrafted upon the statutory language. The surveyed companies indicated
that this limitation on committee powers was nearly always recognized
at the corporate level-it was self-imposed if not expressed in the corporate
by-laws or the resolution creating the committee.
The executive committee has made a place for itself in modern corporate
167. The statutes attempt this by allowing such action only if all or a majority of the
committee members agree in writing beforehand to this procedure. See notes 64-68
supra.
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practice because it is a useful management tool in large, complex corpora-
tions; there, its use allows the board of directors to concentrate its attention
on formulation of long range policies, overall supervision, and unusually
important corporate decisions by relieving the directors of the planning,
execution, and supervision of routine corporate matters. However, since
an executive committee can, in large part, take the management of
its corporation from the board of directors, safeguards are needed to pre-
vent possible usurpation of power. Prior to the advent of statutory authori-
zation and regulation of these committees, the courts had coped with this
problem either by not permitting their use or by restricting the range of their
power and activities. When the growing use of executive committees led
to statutory approval of their use, the need for regulation was met in most
legislative plans by giving the shareholders the power to permit the use of
a committee, limiting committee membership to directors, and either ex-
pressly denying the committee the power to act in certain areas or allow-
ing the shareholders to do so. The present scheme allowing a corporation
to make use of executive committees while attempting to prevent abuses of
power by these groups seems to be a logical middle road between denying
corporate management the use of this helpful tool and permitting a mi-
nority of the board to pre-empt all of the corporation's power through
membership on an executive committee.
APPENDIX
APPENDIX A Questionnaire
I. General
I. Corporate name
2. Address of general offices
3. Nature of business or principal product
4. State and date of incorporation
5. Size:
a. Number of employees
b. Number of operating divisions or departments
6. Does the corporation presently have an executive committee or committees?
7. If so, for how many years has it existed?
8. If not, has it ever had any?
9. Does it have any other committees appointed by the board of directors?
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II. Board of Directors
1. Composition:
a. Number of directors
b. Number of directors who are officers
2. Meetings:
a. Frequency: Weekly ........ ; Bi-Monthly ........ ; Monthly ........ ; Quarterly ........ ;
Other (Specify) .........
b. Quorum requirements: Majority ........ ; Other (Specify) .........
c. Quorum requirements fixed by: Statute ........ ; Articles of incorporation ........ ;
By-Laws .........
d. Number required to act for the board once a quorum exists: Majority ........ ;
Other (Specify) .........
e. What are the notice requirements for regular meetings?
f. Notice requirements fixed by: Statute ........ ; Articles of incorporation ........ ;
By-laws .........
3. Relation of the board of directors to the executive committee:
a. Is it possible to isolate the factors which led to the creation of the commit-
tee? If so, what are they?
b. What powers were expressly delegated to the executive committee by the
board of directors?
c. What powers, if any, were expressly denied to the committee by the board?
d. Control of the board over the committee:
Does the board have a veto power over the actions of the committee?
Does the board suggest areas in which the committee should act?
Is the board's approval required to put the committee's action into effect?
Does the board review the work of the committee?
Is there informal control of the committee through consultation between
the board and the committee before the latter acts?
III. The Executive Committee
1. Composition:
a. Number of members
b. Number who are also officers of the corporation
c. Number who are also directors of the corporation
d. Position of the chairman in the corporation
2. Meetings:
a. Frequency: Bi-weekly ......... ; Weekly ............ ; Monthly ............ ; Other
(Specify) .............
b. Quorum requirements: Majority ........ ; Other (Specify) .........
c. Quorum requirements fixed by: Statute ........ ; Articles of incorporation ........
By-laws ........ ; Board of directors resolution .........
d. Number required to act for the committee once a quorum exists: Major-
ity ........ ; Other (Specify) .........
e. Does the committee have authority to meet at a place other than the general
offices of the corporation? Has it ever done so?
f. What are the notice requirements for regular meetings of the committee?
g. Are directors and officers who are not committee members invited to attend
committee meetings? If so, have they done so often ........ ; occasionally ........
never ........
h. Are committee members elected by the board of directors?
i. Are committee members replaced by: the board of directors ........ ; the com-
mittee .........
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3. Authority of the committee:
a. Is an executive committee specifically authorized by: Articles of Incorpora-
tion ........ ; By-laws .........
b. Was the committee created: for specific purposes (Specify) ........
to act in an advisory capacity to the board of directors ........ ;
to run the corporation while the board was not in session ........
other (Specify) .........
c. Please enumerate and describe the activities the executive committee per-
forms.
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